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Abstract
One of Mill’s primary targets, throughout his work, is intuitionism. In this paper, I
distinguish two strands of intuitionism, against whichMill oﬀers separate arguments. The
first strand, ‘a priorism’ makes an epistemic claim about how we come to know norms.
The second strand, ‘first principle pluralism’, makes a structural claim about how many
fundamental norms there are. In this paper, I suggest that one natural reading of Mill’s
argument against first principle pluralism is incompatible with the naturalism that drives
his argument against a priorism. It must, therefore, be discarded. Such a reading, however,
covertly attributes Mill realist commitments about the normative. These commitments
are unnecessary. To the extent that Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is
taken seriously, I suggest, it is an argument that points towards Mill as having an antireal-
ist approach to the normative.
Ethical intuitionism is a position generally taken to be comprised of two strands. The first
is epistemic: the claim that themind can know directly – without empirical input – truths about
how we ought to act or which states of aﬀairs are good. Call this ‘a priorism’. The second is
structural: that there is more than one fundamental norm in the practical domain. Call this
‘first principle pluralism’.1 Mill takes issue with both of these intuitionistic claims.
It is clear that a priorism and first principle pluralism are not equivalent. A priorism is a claim
about howwe come to know– thatwe can knownormative propositions non-inferentially. First
principle pluralism, in contrast, is a position about the number of those norms and the priority
relation that holds between them. First principle pluralism has nothing to say, on its own terms,
about howwe come to know: one need not say anything about the origins of first principles as
known a priori, in order to think that they might be irreducibly plural. Neither does a priorism
oﬀer any support on purely logical grounds for first principle pluralism.2
1On intuitionism as combining these pluralistic and epistemic claims, see Dancy (1991: 411). See also Rawls (1991:
344ﬀ.) for an influential statement of intuitionism ‘as the doctrine that there is an irreducible family of first principles’,
between which ‘we are simply to strike a balance by intuition’. In a recent and useful discussion, Statton-Lake (2010:
467) also notes this dual aspect of intuitionism: prioritising ‘the view that basic moral principles are self-evident’, he
notes that ‘[m]ost intuitionists are pluralists about basicmoral principles – that is, they believe that there is an irreducible
plurality of basic moral principles’.
2There is, no doubt, an explanation for the fact that the two strands often come bundled together. Those who
have thought that there are many irreducible first principles without a priority relation between them have in general
thought that, where those principles conflict, the only resolution can be an appeal to intuition. But this thought is very
much an added extra to the pluralist claim – it remains open in theory to the first principle pluralist to suggest that
there is an alternative method of resolving conflicts between the competing claims of fundamental norms. Similarly,
those who have looked to intuition to establish fundamental norms a priori have often foundmore than one such norm
intuitively appealing. Once again, this is, strictly, a further claim – it is certainly possible to think that intuitive rational
insight identifies only one such norm.
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The aim here, however, is not to legislate on terminology. ‘Intuitionism’ has come in ethics
to refer both to a priorism and to first principle pluralism, and so long as we use the term care-
fully, this causes little harm. Rather, I wish in this paper to highlight the fact that Mill has
separate arguments against each of these strands of intuitionism – and that while we might
understand the nature of Mill’s argument against a priorism well, we still lack a solid under-
standing of his argument against first principle pluralism. This is easy to miss, perhaps because
the refutation of either conjuct will suﬃce to dismiss intuitionism as a whole. But our lack of
understanding of this argument is to be regretted, for it is indicative of his basic orientation
towards ethics as a human institution, serving human ends.
In this paper, I oﬀer a reading of Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism. I shall
suggest that one natural reading of the argument against first principle pluralism is incompat-
ible with the naturalism that drives Mill’s argument against a priorism. It must, therefore, be
discarded. Such a reading, however, covertly attributes Mill realist commitments about the
normative. These commitments are unnecessary. To the extent that Mill’s argument against
first principle pluralism is taken seriously, I shall suggest, it is an argument that points towards
Mill as having an antirealist approach to the normative.
I Mill against a priorism
The focus of this paper is on Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism, though in order
to assess this argument, it will be useful briefly to rehearse Mill’s views on a priorism. Mill’s
argument against a priorism is generally familiar, and is motivated by his epistemological and
metaphysical naturalism. Mill’s naturalism involves a basic commitment to the claim that hu-
man beings are to be understood as belonging to the natural order – that the operation ofmind,
as well as world, is explicable in natural terms.
Because the mind is a part of nature, any knowledge of the world must be transmitted by
receptive faculties of cognition – the senses. There being no logical relation between matters
of fact, and our own mental composition being merely a matter of fact about how one part of
the natural world is, no observation about how the mind is composed can directly warrant an
inference to facts external to the human mind.3 Wemay, for instance, be naturally disposed to
believe that God exists, or that the parallels postulate is true – or unable to conceive of the falsity
of these propositions.4 But this is merely a fact about our psychology, personal or collective.
An observation of this sort does not provide a priori assurance about the independent issue of
how the world is.
Such an inference would only be warrantable, if we could know a priori that we
must have been created capable of conceivingwhatever is capable of existing: that
the universe of thought and that of reality, the Microcosm and the Macrocosm
(as they once were called) must have been framed in complete correspondence
3In Hume’s terms: ‘In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or eﬀect,
without the assistance of observation and experience’ (Hume 1997: 30).
4Mill often wavers on any given occasion between the denial that a belief is held intuitively – explaining away
a purported intuition as a covertly acquired belief – and the claim that even if it is held intuitively, it is not thereby
warranted. His strategy for any given intuition should not concern us here, though – as is made clear by the following
quotes, the philosophic suspicion of intuition is self-sustained.
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with one another [...] an assumption more destitute of evidence could scarcely
be made. (Examination, ch. 6, IX: 68)5
In this regard, Mill shares with Kant a worry about how a priori knowledge of a world
independent of the mind could be possible. ‘By what means are these things given to us, if not
by the way in which they aﬀect us? And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner
activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to havewith objects – objects that
are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby?’6 – thoughwhereas Kant seeks tomaintain the
possibility of substantive a priori knowledge by rejecting naturalism, Mill maintains naturalism
by rejecting the possibility of substantive a priori knowledge. For Mill, there can be, in Kantian
parlance, no spontaneous knowledge of how things are: only knowledge earned through our
receptivity to the world.7
This is a result of a naturalistic view of the mind – beliefs, as mental states, are outcomes of
causal circumstances, and are therefore explicable in natural terms. Some beliefs will be given
vindicating explanations by pointing to the nature of the circumstances that occasion their for-
mation – showing that they arise from suitable natural interactionwith the object of knowledge.
But such a causal story cannot be given about beliefs which do not involve interaction with the
world – at least not without appeal to further facts which are themselves established empiri-
cally.8 ‘[A] conviction might be really innate, i.e. prior to individual experience, and yet not
be true, since the inherited tendency to accept it may have been originally the result of other
causes than its truth’ (System, II.vii.4, VII: 276).
Mill’s view that there are ‘no truths cognizable by the mind’s inward light, and grounded
on intuitive evidence’ (Coleridge, X: 125) extends to the practical domain. ‘The doctrine of a
priori principles is one and the same doctrine, whether applied to the ὂν or the δέον – to the
knowledge of truth or that of duty’ (Whewell on Moral Philosophy, X: 171).9 Claims about how
there is reason to act are not merely verbal claims – they are substantive claims, and cannot,
Mill argues, be known merely by reflection on how we use words. Indeed, it is here that he
held that the ‘notion that truths external to the human mind may be known by intuition’ was
in his time ‘the great intellectual support for false doctrines’ (Mill, Autobiography, ch. 7, I: 233).
The citation of the intuitions in support of claims about how we ought to act, Mill holds, is
again merely to report matters of psychology – but such facts do not warrant beliefs about
which principles have objective call on us, and to think otherwise is to make ‘opinions their
own proof, and feelings their own justification’ (Letter to Theodore Gomperz, 19 Aug 1854,
XIV: 134).10
To take such beliefs as their own justification is to sacrifice any claim to objectivity in ethics,
5All quotes from Mill are taken from Mill (1963–91). References are given by (Short title, chapter/section, volume:
page).
6See Letter from Kant to Marcus Herz, 21 Feb 1772, 10: 131, reprinted in Kant (1991).
7On the relation of Mill to Kant on this point, see Skorupski (1989: 5–8).
8So, for instance, one might oﬀer an empirical argument to vindicate the appeal to intuitions, by pointing to the
past success of intuitional beliefs, or by oﬀering some evolutionary reason to think that intuitions track truth. But this
aﬀords warrant to such beliefs on the grounds established a posteriori – not on the basismerely of what we find ourselves
disposed to believe.
9Such, interestingly, Mill thought, ‘has always been indistinctly thought’, but only ‘proved’ by ‘the German meta-
physicians of the last and present age’.
10This phrase, in variations, is a favourite of Mill’s to highlight the problem of intuitionism. See also System, III.xii.1,
VII: 564, andWhewell on Moral Philosophy, X: 177, 178.
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for it precludes the possibility of a separate standard by which to judge those beliefs.11 As such,
a priorism about practical reason – that the mind can know directly truths about how we ought
to act or which states of aﬀairs are good – is false.
We see no ground for believing that anything can be the object of our knowledge
except our experience, andwhat can be inferred from experience by the analogies
of experience itself; nor that there is any idea, feeling, or power in the human
mind, which, in order to account for it, requires that its origin should be referred
to any other source. (Coleridge, X: 128–9)
Such isMill’s argument against a priorism – similar points would bemade later by twentieth-
century philosophers such as Quine, also seeking to explore the philosophic consequences of
a thoroughgoing naturalism. The reading has been repeated many times recently, and I will
assume, for the purposes of this paper, that Mill was at least on the right track in pursuing his
naturalistic views this far.12
II Mill against first principle pluralism
As was noted above, there are two quite distinct strands to intuitionism, and as well as taking
issue with the a prioristic strand, Mill also argues against first principle pluralism – the claim
that there is no single practical principle against which acts should be judged, but, rather, many
equally fundamental principles.13 This might, for instance, take the form of a belief that there are
two principles – that one should maximize happiness and that one should always tell the truth
– with no way to guarantee that they will coincide, and no way to resolve conflicts when they
occur.
(a) First principle pluralism and Utilitarianism
In the opening chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill notes that intuitionists hold that principles deter-
mining howwe ought to act are known a priori. What is important, for our purposes, is that he
argues against this position not by taking issue with its epistemic strategy of intuitionism, but
by taking issue with its pluralism. The following is a key passage from Utilitarianism I.3.
The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics,
insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an
11It has long been recognised that attempting to establish an objective basis for ethics was a central aim for Mill. See
Ryan (1987: 187ﬀ ).
12See, for instance, Miller (2010: 14–18), and Donner and Fumerton (2009: 155–74).
13As is by now generally acknowledged, the principle of utility is for Mill the supreme principle of practical rea-
son overall, sitting at the head of the ‘Art of Life’ – see System, VI.xii.6, VIII: 949–50. Of course, Mill often implies in
Utilitarianism that the principle of utility applies directly to the moral domain, determining not just what there is most
reason to do, but what is morally required. On my reading, this is best understood as a simplifying device of exposition
at the start of a popular work, to be corrected throughout that work, and in particular by the sentimentalist account
of distinctively moral requirements given in chapter 5. As this paper primarily concerns the principle of utility, I will
frame the discussion in this paper in terms of practicality rather thanmorality – though in quoting from earlier chapters
of Utilitarianism, I draw on passages in which Mill uses morality as a proxy for practicality more generally. Little, in
any case, hangs on the moral/practical distinction for the purposes of the arguments made here (though whether one
reads the argument as having application to morality or practicality more broadly will of course determine what Mill’s
antirealism is about). On the moral/practical distinction in Mill, see Jacobson (2008) and Eggleston (forthcoming).
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individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a
law to an individual case. They recognise also, to a great extent, the same moral
laws; but diﬀer as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their
authority. According to [the intuitionists], the principles of morals are evident
a priori, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the
terms be understood. [...] Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the a pri-
ori principles which are to serve as the premises of the science; still more rarely
do they make any eﬀort to reduce those various principles to one first principle,
or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts of
morals as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of
those maxims, some generality much less obviously authoritative than the max-
ims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance.
Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one fundamental
principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should
be a determinate order of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the
rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be
self-evident. (Utilitarianism, ch. 1, X: 206–7)
Though the target is clearly pluralism, the details of Mill’s argument in Utilitarianism I.3
are not easy to follow. The intuitionists are criticised on the grounds that they lack some ‘one
fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality’ or ‘a determinate order of precedence
among’ their proposed principles, becausewithout this, they cannot ‘support their pretensions’.
What these pretensions are, however, is a little less obvious. Earlier in the paragraph,Millwrites
that ‘those believers in [a moral instinct] who have any pretensions to philosophy, have been
obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand’
and have therefore retreated to the claim that amoral instinct ‘supplies us only with the general
principles of moral judgments’ (Utilitarianism, ch. 1, X: 206).
It seems, then, that the substance of the pretension Mill has in mind is that practical eval-
uation be grounded on ‘general laws’ – that determinations about how we ought to act are
specified not by direct perception of the normative status of acts, but by ‘the application of a
law to an individual case’ (Utilitarianism, ch. 1, X: 206). Mill thinks this pretension – which all
genuine philosophers are supposed to admit – cannot be met by those who endorse a system
that is structured around an irreducibly pluralistic set of principles.
The basic diﬃculty Mill has in mind seems clear. Where a moral system has only one prin-
ciple to assess actions, there is, trivially, a principled mechanism of assessing any action: find
out whether the action lives up to the specified principle. With multiple principles, lexically
ordered, there is, again, a principled means by which to assess an action: consult the lexically
dominant principle first, and if no answer is returned, consult the lexically sub-dominant princi-
ple, and so forth. Given an irreducibly plural and unordered set of principles, however, we have
no principled means to assess an action, for we have no means of deciding to which principle
we should first appeal. And so, Mill believes, for the pluralist, there is no principled mechanism
by which to assess actions.14
Mill’s worry about pluralism, then, is essentially a worry about the rule following. Those
who believe in an irreducible plurality of principles are disloyal to their commitment to gen-
14This interpretation finds support in the work of those (few) commentators who have discussed this passage of
Utilitarianism in detail. See, for instance, West (2007: 32–4) and Donner (1991: 32–3).
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uinely principled judgment, because they donot specify the further and necessarymeta-principles
with which to interpret and implement their heap of duties.15 Irreducible pluralism collapses
into a higher-order variety of particularism, relying on direct perception of which principle
should take precedence on any given occasion. But such a priori perception is nomore convinc-
ing than first-order moral perception of the rightness and wrongness of actions themselves.
(b) Assessing the argument
The first thing we should note about this argument is that, insofar as it presents a problem for
irreducible pluralism, it presents a generalised problem for any form of irreducible pluralism
and not merely pluralism with an a priori epistemology. As noted, first principle pluralism is
not directly connected to any doctrine about how we come to know norms. Were the inductivist
to propose an irreducible plurality of practical principles, Mill’s worry would apply equally well
to that claim.
The second thing we ought to note is that this argument is presented in the mode of a
conceptual argument. The argument is not that systems with multiple principles have been
trialled in the past, and have been shown to be unworkable on the grounds of irresolvable
disputes. Rather, the argument is that, in order for an ethical system to claim to be principled
– which is part of what it means to be an ethical system, Mill thinks all ‘who are entitled to
the name of thinking’ admit – it must possess a principled method of decisively arbitrating the
status of any action. The argument is ambitious. ThoughMill does not frame it in these terms,
it has the eﬀect of ruling out the possibility – on conceptual grounds – of a certain kind of
practical dilemma, whereby the assessment of an action is problematically over determined.16
If the pluralist is correct, Mill claims, one action might be assessed by two standards, without
a court of appeal when conflicts occur. But this cannot be, for to believe this would be merely
to abandon the claim that assessment of action is guided by principles.
So stated, the result does not seem trivial – it is philosophically significant and interesting.
Arguments that bear a strikingly similarity to Mill’s – that is a formal feature of moral systems
that dilemmas cannot occur – have been made more recently, and have grown increasingly
sophisticated.17 It will not be my task here to assess this claim in its own terms, but rather to
question whether Mill should have been able to make this species of argument. For given its
seeming non-triviality, Mill’s limitations on the power of the a priori might be thought to rule
out such a strong result. Wemight worry, that is to say, whether Mill should have taken himself
to be able to establish monism by merely conceptual argumentation.
As was seen in section I, Mill holds that truths by definition are the only results that can be
established a priori. Yet Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism involves moving from
‘subject to evaluation’ to ‘subject to evaluation by one fundamental principle’ a priori, and it
does not seem plausible to characterise this as a merely verbal inference. It does not seem
plausible to hold that the intuitionist who claims that there are multiple, equally fundamental,
practical principles is making a linguisticmistake andmisusing the terms – nor does it seem that
15Of course, asWittgenstein would later point out, a push can be generated to specify meta-principles of interpreta-
tion and implementation even in the cases of single principles – leading to a regress problem in general for normativity.
Mill does not see this issue clearly, and I will not pursue it here.
16West (2007: 34) draws out the connection between Utilitarianism I.3 and moral dilemmas. As we shall see, the
connection is brought more clearly to the foreground in a related passage in System VI.xii.7.
17See, for example, Hill (1996) and Zimmerman (1996: ch. 7).
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a denial that there is only one fundamental principle guiding action is radically incoherent by
virtue of the meaning of ‘guiding action’.
The crux of the matter is this: if Mill holds that no substantive results can be established
a priori, then there is at least something to be explained about why he thinks it possible to
establish the falsity of first principle pluralism a priori. Mill takes issue with the structure of
intuitionism on a priori grounds – but it is not obvious that Mill should have taken himself to
know anything about the necessary structure of morality a priori.
(c) Ignoring the argument
My task within this section so far has been to suggest that the argument of Utilitarianism I.3
is, at least, puzzling. It might, however, be thought that rather too much is being made of the
passage. After all, this is but one comparatively short argument, and Mill has, besides, another
argument against pluralism later in that same work. In Utilitarianism IV.4–12, Mill oﬀers an em-
pirical argument to vindicate his monism. Mill here considers proposed non-utilitarian objects
of desire, questioning whether they, in addition to happiness, might be considered to generate
fundamental moral principles. Mill’s particular target is those who think that the cultivation
of virtue might be an irreducible practical end, though the argument oﬀered generalises. Mill
claims that, though other objects may appear to have the status of ultimate goals of action, the
desire for such objects are in fact grounded in the desire for happiness.
Mill’s ‘parts of happiness’ argument is an empirical argument for monism, aided by as-
sociationistic psychology. Mill does not argue that all desires must, by virtue of meaning, be
subsumed under the heading ‘happiness’. Rather, he claims that in the case of a desire for virtue
(as in the case of a desire for wealth, power, or fame) ‘[w]hat was once desired as an instrument
for the attainment of happiness, has come to be desired for its own sake’ (Utilitarianism, ch. 4, X:
236). Mill writes that ‘there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired
otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as
itself a part of happiness, and is not desire for itself until it has become so’ (Utilitarianism, ch.
4, X: 237). What was once a means to happiness has become so closely associated with that
goal as to enter into our very conception of what it means to be happy. As such, there are no
additional ultimate goals, and a utilitarian monism is preserved.18
This is more the flavour of argument that we might expect from an empiricist. As such,
we may be tempted to downplay the argument from chapter 1 of Utilitarianism as a mere slip
– an instance of an unconsidered argument, motivated by the desire to make a particularly
strong opening gambit against the intuitionists, which it would do little harm to Mill’s project
to ignore. But there is strong evidence to suggest that this was not accidental overreaching,
but a well considered argument, showing an important development in Mill’s thinking. The
passage highlighted in Utilitarianism I.3 finds a close parallel in an argument oﬀered in Book VI
of the System.
There is, then, a Philosophia Prima peculiar to Art, as there is one which belongs
to Science. There are not only first principles of Knowledge, but first principles
of Conduct. There must be some standard by which to determine the goodness
or badness, absolute and comparative, of ends or objects of desire. And whatever
that standard is, there can be but one: for if there were several ultimate principles
18See Crisp (1997: 83–88) for useful discussion on this argument.
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of conduct, the same conduct might be approved by one of those principles and
condemned by another; and there would be needed somemore general principle
as umpire between them. (System, VI.xii.7, VIII: 951)19
The section from which this argument is taken – System VI.xii.7 – was inserted into the
3rd edition of the System, in 1851. The section was added by Mill alongside System VI.xii.6,
which oﬀers consideration of what Mill termed (drawing explicitly on work by ‘the German
metaphysicians’) ‘the principles of Practical Reason’ (System, VI.xii.6, VIII: 949–950). These
sections, then, are indicative of conscious engagement by Mill with questions concerning the
structure of practical rationality, sustained at least between 1851 and the initial publication of
Utilitarianism in 1861. The argument should not be discarded: it is representative of ongoing
consideration of important themes in moral philosophy.
The statement of the argument in System VI.xii.7 is, of course, subtly diﬀerent from that
in Utilitarianism I.3. The generation of practical dilemmas under pluralism is brought more
sharply into focus in the System passage than in Utilitarianism; the need for some one principle
is pressed on these grounds, rather than on the grounds of adhering to a principled, rather than
particularist, approach to ethics. This is, however, merely a change in accent. And interestingly,
in the argument of the System, the theoretical reason, alongside the practical reason, is brought
into play. ‘There are not only first principles of Knowledge, but first principles of Conduct’
(System, VI.xii.7, VIII: 951). Given that this discussion comes at the end of a book-long argument
as to the supremacy of inductive reasoning, it is natural to assume that Mill is here gesturing
towards the principle of enumerative induction as the first principle of theoretical reasoning;
this might suggest that Mill thinks of the faculties of reasoning as sharing structural features
that prevent over-determination dilemmas in either domain. I shall return to this thought in
section IV.
Despite these diﬀerences, the basic claim of each passage is the same. A moral theory
which has more than one fundamental norm does not provide a principled means of assessing
actions, because these norms could issue diﬀering assessments, with no principled means of
determining which assessment should take precedence. And the key objection remains. It
is not clear that Mill’s empiricist epistemology should allow the dismissal of this possibility a
priori. Mill’s argument is a conceptual one for monism, but given of his naturalism, it is unclear
whether such powerful results should be available to Mill prior to empirical investigation.
III Two readings of the argument
Let me briefly recount the state of play. I have argued that intuitionism is a position comprised
of two claims: a claim that we can know practical norms by direct rational insight (a priorism),
and a claim that there is more than one fundamental practical norm in the practical domain
(first principle pluralism). Mill argues against the first strand of intuitionism by denying that
there can be any genuine knowledge a priori, and against the second by suggesting that only
monism is compatible with a view of practical judgment as being properly determined by the
application of principles. The worry which emerged in section II is how Mill can claim to
know anything about the structure of normativity prior to empirical investigation. If Mill’s
arguments against the a prioristic strand of intuitionism are successful – and we have seen that
19Donner also draws a comparison between this passage and textitUtilitarianism I.3. See Donner (1991: 32).
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they aremotivated by a naturalismwhichmanywill find appealing – then nothingwith genuine
content can be known a priori, monism included.
The question is whyMill takes himself to know that the world couldn’t have been such that
pluralism was true, prior to the ‘practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by
observation of others’ he advocates for the study of practical reason (Utilitarianism, ch. 4, X:
237). Mill’s objection to first principle pluralism is that it allows for the possibility of cases in
which our fundamental practical principles might conflict. Now, to be sure, if the world turned
out to be such that we were subject to genuinely conflicting practical principles, it would be a
genuinely sticky situation for human agents to be in – but it is far from clear that this should
be taken as evidence for the fact that pluralism is false. The first principle pluralist is likely to
grant that it is bad luck for humans to find themselves in this situation, but to maintain that this
is just the way the world is. After all, they might claim, the world wasn’t built with humans in
mind, and it is under no obligation to make things easy for us – and it is reasonably clear that
Mill would agree with this sentiment.
(a) Realism and antirealism
There is, then, at least a tension. In order to see how this tension can be defused, it will be
useful first to characterise, in the broadest terms, two basic approaches to the status of norms
of practical reason. It is notoriously diﬃcult to find a satisfactory way to mark the distinction
between realism and antirealism about any given domain precisely – though the persistence of
the distinction indicates that there is some deep and fundamental disagreement that it strives
to articulate. One aspect of the disagreement, at least, centres on the basic question of whether
objects in a given domain are in some sensemind-independent.20 The realist about electrons, for
example, thinks that they exist independently of whether human beings believe them to; the
antirealist thinks that the term ‘electron’ is a construction, its use vindicated by the role it plays
in our lives. There are various ways to attempt to bring out this disagreement – to press the
question of whether electrons really exist, whether they are ‘out there in the world’, or whether
they would exist even if we didn’t think to carve the world as we do. But these are, at root,
just so many ways of attempting to specify an important sort of independence from human
cognition.
As one can be a realist about electrons, so one can be a realist about practical norms – hold-
ing that there are mind-independent facts about how we should act.21 In this spirit, one might
claim: ‘It really is wrong to lie. And it would be, whatever human beliefs and desires were!’
Such a realist can, of course, accept that such norms are highly abstract, finding implementation
in practice only by combination with concrete facts about human psychology. They can do so
while maintaining that the most primitive norms themselves are not dependent on such facts –
that ‘the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratifica-
20Independence need not be the only claim that realism makes – but there is consensus that it is least one important
aspect of the realist temperament. See, for example, Crispin Wright, who along with the ‘modesty’ of independence
(‘that the external world exists independently of us, that it is as it is independently of the conceptual vocabulary in
terms of which we think about it, and that it is as it is independently of the beliefs about it which we do, will, or ever
would form’) characterises realism as endorsing a certain ‘presumptuousness’ of basic accuracy (Wright 1992: 1ﬀ.). See
also Tim Button on the credo of realism, which combines the independence principle (‘The world is (largely) made up
of objects that are mind-, language-, and theory independent’) with the principle of truth as correspondence and the
possibility of radical falsity (Button 2013: 7–11).
21See DeLapp (2013: 12–18) for a useful defence and clarification of this aspect moral realism.
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tion from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective’ (Shafer-Landau 2013:15).22 The
following, then, might be taken as a rough statement of realism about practical norms.
Practical realism: there are truths about howwe should act which are independent
of human beliefs and goals.
Antirealism, of course, can be taken to be a denial of this claim.
Practical antirealism: there are no truths about howwe should act which are inde-
pendent of human beliefs and goals.
The best known versions of practical antirealism are those theories which deny that there are
truths about how we should act independent of human beliefs and goals. Such positions are
noncognitivist. But it is important to note that the position practical antirealismneed not amount
to a denial of truth-aptitude or objectivity of practical norms. One can, rather than deny that
there are truths about how we should act independent of human beliefs and goals, deny that
there are truths about how we should act independent of human beliefs and goals. Practical an-
tirealism need not imply noncognitivism about the normative anymore than antirealism about
scientific terms implies noncognitivism about scientific discourse – it mightmerely involve a re-
casting of truth and objectivity in an antirealist mould.23 Such positions can be broadly termed
cognitivist antirealism.24
(b) Mill as an antirealist
This is meant to be no more than the briefest characterisation of two general approaches to
the normative, intended to help us better understand Mill’s argument against first principle
pluralism. On what I shall term the ‘realist reading’ of Utilitarianism I.3 and System VI.xii.7,
Mill’s argument is problematic, because he claims to know that monism is true prior to any
empirical investigation. And because we have no means of being receptive to facts external to
the mind prior to empirical investigation, it certainly would be problematic to claim to know
that monism was true a priori, if monism’s truth was a fact about how the world is: it would
be to assume ‘that the universe of thought and that of reality [...] must have been framed in
complete correspondence with one another’ (Examination, ch. 6, IX: 68). But, of course, this
reading assumes practical realism.
22To clarify this by way of an example, we might consider realist and antirealist interpretations of (a naïve version
of ) utilitarianism. The utilitarian might claim that the practical norm that pleasure is desirable is mind-independent,
and thereby qualify as a realist, while acknowledging that in order to assess any given action, knowledge of mind-
dependent facts (i.e. about what human beings find pleasurable) is needed. Alternatively, the utilitarian might claim
that all practical norms, including the norm that pleasure is desirable, are mind-dependent, and thereby qualify as an
antirealist. One test of whether an account of practical normativity is realist or antirealist is to ask: could even our most
fundamental norms have been diﬀerent, had human beings or their communities been diﬀerently constituted? So, for instance, to
the extent that Aristotle holds that, had our forms of life been diﬀerent, ourmost fundamental structures of value could
have been diﬀerent, he thereby endorses a form of antirealism. One place in which such a test is awkward to apply, of
course, is where the counterfactual is hard to assess. Kant, who holds that morality is grounded not on how human
beings happen to be, but on the necessary structure of the will of any finite rational agent who experiences empirical
incentives, serves as a useful example – it is for this reason that it is diﬃcult to judge whether we should think of his
position as realist or constructivist.
23See Fisher (2010: 346–55) for useful discussion.
24John Skorupski’s ‘cognitivist irrealism’ is one such version of this theory (see Skorupski 2010: 420–41.) But, equally,
response-dependence accounts (see Pettit 1991), and more recent constructivist accounts (see Street 2008) share the
attempt to oﬀer a cognitivist account without robust mind-independence.
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If we are not prepared to discard Mill’s claim to know about the structure of normativity
a priori – as I suggested in I(c) that we should not be – the obvious alternative is to attempt a
more sophisticated reading of Mill as an antirealist. Whether such a reading is viable depends
on whether Mill thinks that the most fundamental facts of practical normativity are at root
human-dependent, and whether knowledge of those norms, therefore, is not knowledge of
some mind-independent reality, but something else entirely.
Recall that the argument for monism turned on the fact that first principle pluralism does
not generate a method of decisively arbitrating the status of any action – it allows that the
same action might be approved by one principle, and condemned by another. This argument
suggests that Mill thinks that a system of practical norms can be criticised on the basis that it
doesn’t fulfil the function we expect of it. Pluralism is faulted because it might fail to issue
instruction on how to act in certain circumstances – and that is what practical norms are for. A
system of practical norms which generated practical dilemmas, Mill claims, would be a system
which didn’t answer our questions about how to act – and it is the primary job of such a system
to steer our actions. What we need from norms appears, at least in part, to determine those
norms. And in this regard, Mill shows a basic orientation towards practical antirealism.
The practical antirealist takes norms to be a tool which enables us to navigate the world.
But in this case, even the most fundamental norms turn on how human beings are – the nature
of their agency, and the human goals their norms facilitate. This is not to say, of course, that
such truths can be reduced to natural facts about how human beings are. Wemight take norms,
following a noncognitivst reading of Mill, to be prescriptions issued in a universal voice – and
interpret the argument as suggesting that prescriptions just wouldn’t be useful as such, unless
theywere clear and could be followed. Or, with the cognitivist antirealist, wemight take norms
to be those principles which ideal judges would freely take as making a claim on them – and
place weight on the claim that such judges would not endorse conflicting norms, by virtue of
the idealisation.25 Neither of these theories would reduce the normative to facts about human
beings, but attempt some other grounding relation.
I should stress that I do not wish to push for either of these conclusions here – my goal in
this paper is not to argue for any particular antirealist reading of Mill. The question of which
antirealist position should be attributed to Mill is certainly an interesting one in its own right,
but one which requires analysis that cannot be attempted here.26 The key claim here is rather
that we should, for the reasons cited above, approach Mill as basically antirealist in orientation,
and the point to be emphasised is that valid practical norms are not, for Mill, truths about how
the external world is composed – but are dependent on human goals all the way down. As
such, knowledge of the structure of such norms need not involve mysterious intuition of facts
external to the mind, but rather critical reflection on the conditions that render the principled
guidance of human actions possible. Mill takes himself to know a priori that monism is true not
25These readings are meant to be no more than suggestive of two possible antirealist readings of Mill – the options
presented are clearly not exhaustive. The latter reading, however, clearly bears on other issues of Mill’s philosophy
related to the qualitative distinction between pleasures outlined in Utilitarianism II.3–9. It is a continuing point of
interpretive debate as to whether competent judgment in these passages is meant to be constitutive of pleasures being
higher, or merely evidential. Another way of framing this issue, however, is simply to ask whether a given pleasure’s
being higher or lower is a mind-dependent or mind-independent fact, and whether an antirealist reading of Mill is correct
will therefore have important consequences for this issue. (On the debate, see, for instance, Crisp (1997: 26–7) and
Millgram (2002: 296–7)).
26See, however, Macleod (2013a), in which I argue against Ryan’s claim (1987: 188–90) that we should not read Mill
as a noncognitivist. Such a reading leaves open the possibility a cognitive antirealist reading.
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because a priori cognition is guaranteed to conform to some set ofmind-independent normative
facts, but because normative facts must conform to their role in regulating human aﬀairs.27
Read in this manner, the worry that the world might turn out to be such that pluralism is
true or that this cannot be ruled out prior to inquiry makes little sense, given the questions that
Mill is asking. For Mill is asking not what is the world like, but what must our system of practical
norms be like to guide action? The question decidedly doesn’t focus on whether there are values
in the worldwhich might conflict, but how practical norms must be structured if they are to be
of any use to beings such as ourselves.28
The reading of Mill as an antirealist – as holding that the most fundamental norms are
human dependent – finds support in his general strategy in attempting to discover the content
of practical norms. Looking to human psychology during the proof – what human beings
freely do desire, when attending critically to those desires – Mill does not seek to establish what
is valuable for beings other than ourselves, but what is desirable for beings of our nature. It is a
key part of the proof that ‘[h]uman nature is so constituted as to desire nothingwhich is not either
a part of happiness or a means to happiness’ (Utilitarianism, ch. 4, X: 237, my emphasis). That
is a feature of how we are, which might not be shared with beings constituted very diﬀerently
fromus – and the Principle of Utility is therefore principle for beings such as ourselves. Practical
norms are human norms, reflecting human psychological traits.
IV Antirealism and normativity
Mill is pushed towards practical antirealism by his commitment to naturalism. If the only things
that exist are natural things, then questions about the nature of practical norms loom large, and
the naturalist is put under pressure to provide an account of those norms. What are norms, and
where do they fit into an ontology exhausted by natural objects and an epistemology exhausted
by empirical observation? One option is some form of naturalistic realism or reductionism –
to claim that norms just are natural facts, at least under some description.29 Another option is
some form of antirealism – to claim that norms themselves are not, and cannot be reduced to
natural facts, and to oﬀer an account of the discipline of normative discourse by appeal to the
role it plays in our lives.
The point is seen clearly in the case of practical normativity, which concerns reasons for
action – it is generally acknowledged that what there is reason to do in a situation is not identical
to any natural fact about that situation. But the case of theoretical normativity presents parallel
27It is, of course, an open question as to whether Mill should assume that we know even the role which practical
norms play for us a priori. The push to doubtwhatever assumptions the antirealist attempts tomake use of in explicating
the normative is a powerful one. We must keep in mind, however, that such a priori assumptions might be just that:
beliefs which strike us spontaneously as reasonable and are aﬀorded initial credibility, but which remain subject to
revision, should there emerge any reason to doubt them. Mill deploys this tactic elsewhere in his work. See Macleod
(2013b: 62–3).
28As has been pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, we might doubt that Mill has given us suﬃcient reason to
trust that only a system of practical norms which gives decisive and univocal instruction in each and every possible
situation would meet our needs and guide action. Indeed, this claim does seem to require more argument than Mill
provides – and such an argument would perhaps itself be suspicious if made in a priori terms. One possible solution
for Mill is to argue for the regulative assumption that we should, as philosophers, continue to look for and assume the
existence of a single norm to systematise our practice. Such a view, of course, will be hostage to a lingering suspicion
that the complexities of life mean that there just is no such norm to be found.
29Such as that oﬀered, for instance, by the Cornell Realists. See, for instance, Brink (1989).
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issues to that of practical normativity. There are reasons for belief, as well as reasons for action
– and the status of reasons to believe are no less in need of explanation by the naturalist than the
status of reasons to act. That performing action a will give me some pleasure provides reason
to perform a; that b is well supported by the evidence gives reason to believe b. But the fact
that there is reason to believe b is no more identical to the natural facts surrounding b than the
fact that there is reason to perform a is identical to the natural facts surrounding a.
Mill sees this parallel between theoretical and practical normativity – as John Skorupski ob-
serves, ‘Mill’s way of vindicating the claim that happiness is desirable, is exactly analogous to his
way of vindicating the claim that enumerative induction is rational’ (Skorupski 1989: 286). In
both cases, Mill justifies normative principles by appealing to agents’ spontaneous dispositions.
The fundamental principle of theoretical reason – the principle of enumerative induction – is
grounded in the fact that human agents spontaneously take an observation that x1, x2, x3, ...
xn are P as providing reason to believe that some unobserved xn+1 is P. The fundamental prin-
ciple of practical reason – the principle of utility – is grounded in the fact that human agents
spontaneously take a sensation’s being pleasurable as providing reason to desire it.30
It is well known that Mill endorses only one norm in the theoretical domain – the princi-
ple of enumerative induction. The System is an extended argument to show that application of
this principle is the sole means of legitimating theoretical beliefs. This, of course, leads to the
rejection of inference to the best explanation as an autonomous principle of reasoning – Mill
claims that hypotheses about unobserved entities made in an eﬀort to explain empirical obser-
vations can provide useful suestions, but that warrant for these belief can only be provided
by reasoning based on the principle of enumerative induction.31 ‘[H]ypothesis, by suggesting
observations and experiments, puts us on the road to that independent evidence if it be really
attainable’ (System, III.xiv.4, VII: 496, my emphasis).
The attempt to account for all warranted theoretical inferences by way of induction has
consequences throughout Mill’s philosophy – most notably, it leads to his rejection of the ex-
ternal world and an endorsement of a phenomenalistic idealism. We only ever experience sen-
sations, Mill argues – ‘our knowledge of objects [...] consist[s] in nothing but the sensation
which they excite’ (Examination, ch. 2, IX: 6.) Because our mind never makes unmediated con-
tact with objects genuinely external to the mind, a belief that there are such objects behind our
perceptions cannot be justified on the basis of induction – this would amount to a postulation
of something unobserved to explain observed entities, and such an inference is exactly the sort of
hypothesis that Mill thinks is not warranted if unsupported by inductive reasoning (Skorupski
1989: 233). All that can be established inductively is that such objects of sensation are stable –
that they can be returned to, after durations in which they go unperceived. ‘Matter may be
defined, then, a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked, whether I believe in matter,
I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition. If he does, I believe in matter: and so do
all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I do not’ (Examination, ch. 10, IX: 183).
What is less clear is why Mill thought that there could be only one supreme principle of
theoretical reason. Principles of theoretical reason are to be discovered, as we have seen, by
observing the spontaneous dispositions of human agents – ‘learnt by seeing the agent at work’
(System, VI.i.1, VII: 833) – and there is a good case to be made that a principle of inference
30For detailed consideration of the parallel between theoretical and practical normativity inMill’s work, seeMacleod
(2014).
31As Skorupski puts it, Mill ‘was unable to accept that the Hypothetical Method is an autonomous method of in-
duction – that it is an independent and primitive principle of the ‘Logic of Truth” (1989: 197).
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to the best explanation does play this role in our ordinary reasoning. If that is so, it seems
clear that Mill should endorse this as an autonomous principle.32 Mill notes that hypotheses
are always underdetermined by the data – though this of course holds for inductive inferences.
The question might be pressed as to whether there are deeper reasons for Mill to reject the
possibility of the existence of multiple principles of theoretical reason.
Consider the text quoted from System VI.xii.6 previously.
There is, then, a Philosophia Prima peculiar to Art, as there is one which belongs
to Science. There are not only first principles of Knowledge, but first principles
of Conduct. There must be some standard by which to determine the goodness
or badness, absolute and comparative, of ends or objects of desire. And whatever
that standard is, there can be but one: for if there were several ultimate principles
of conduct, the same conduct might be approved by one of those principles and
condemned by another; and there would be needed somemore general principle
as umpire between them. (System, VI.xii.7, VIII: 951)
In this passage, Mill explicitly parallels the case of practical normativity to theoretical norma-
tivity. Coming at the end of the System, it seems clear that the Philosophia Prima of theoretical
reason that Mill refers to is the principle of induction. It should be noted that the same argu-
ment that Mill makes explicit in the case of practical reason can be applied in the theoretical
case – the merits of that argument do not depend on any features peculiar to practical norma-
tivity. If there were several ultimate principles of theoretical reason, the same belief might be
approved by one of those principles and condemned by another – for the theoretical pluralist,
there would be no principled mechanism by which to assess beliefs. One who believes (for in-
stance) in both the principle of enumerative induction and the principle of inference to the best
explanation opens up the possibility of cases in which our fundamental theoretical principles
clash, suggesting conflicting beliefs with no more general principle as umpire between them.
To read the argument in System VI.xii.6 as having application to the theoretical reason as
well as the practical reason is, of course, to read Mill as an antirealist about this domain also.
But, as noted, the force of the metaphysical push towards antirealism that comes from Mill’s
naturalism should be felt here just as strongly as in the practical case. (That there is reason to
believe ϕ is not itself a physical fact – so what makes it true, and how does this norm fit into
our view of the world?) And, because Mill endorses a broad parallelism between theoretical
and practical normativity, antirealism in one domain is good evidence of antirealism in both.
Under this reading, Mill’s theoretical monism is guided by consideration of what a system of
theoretical norms must be like, if it is to play the role of guiding belief.
The claim that theoretical norms are constrained by what humans need them to do – that
they too are tools which help us navigate the world, and which are in part determined by the
role they play in our lives – of course pushes Mill in the direction of later pragmatist move-
ments. Opening up the question of the role theoretical norms play in our lives generates the
possibility that they ultimately play some practical role. This should be of no surprise. Mill’s
thoroughgoing naturalism is often compared to Quine, who himself argued for ‘a shift toward
pragmatism’ (Quine 1961: 20). James, pushed to pragmatism as the result of his ‘radical em-
piricism’, saw an ally in Mill, fromwhom he ‘first learned the pragmatic openness of mind’ and
who he pictured ‘as our leader were he alive to-day’ ( James 1907: v).
32See Skorupski (1989: 197ﬀ.) on this point.
14
Such connections are suggestive – though can be taken as no more than that. I have, in
this article, proposed that Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism in the practical do-
main points towards an antirealism about practical reason – that Mill’s naturalistically driven
argument against intuitionism suggests that we could not know that practical monism is true
a priori if practical monism was a mind-independent fact about how the world is. I have also
proposed that there is at least a case to be made for a parallel argument in the theoretical case.
But the details of Mill’s antirealism remain verymuch unknown. The nature of the dependence
relation between humans and the norms of reason still requires investigation – as do the con-
sequences of Mill’s account of human malleability for any antirealist interpretation. However,
with the recent increase of focus on the details of Mill’s account of normativity, there is reason
to be hopeful that these questions are coming more sharply into focus.
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